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Abstract
This article revisits the origins of the Islamic reformist movement
that arose in response to the challenges presented by western civ-
ilization in the nineteenth century. Tunisia was chosen because the
spirit of reform manifested itself in the form of intellectual activ-
ity and socio-political action. The article highlights the features of
the Tunisian experience before the French occupation in 1881,
reveals the cooperation and complementary relationship between
religious scholars and statesmen that gave the reform efforts their
substance and form, and discusses the dynamic of the forces that
were in play and helped determine the attempted reforms’ fate.
Introduction
The reform spirit and ideas that germinated in Tunisia during the nineteenth
century and the efforts made to implement them were part of a general cur-
rent seen in many Muslim lands, especially in those affiliated with the Otto-
mans. Despite the common aspects of the reform movements and efforts that
unfolded in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere, each experiment had its dis-
tinctive features due to its guiding ideas and the type of challenges it faced.
In the following pages, a textual and historical analysis delineates the pro-
cession and dynamic of the ideas that guided and underpinned Tunisia’s
reformist action and culminated in the work of Khayr al-Din Pasha.
The First Phase: Military-based Reforms
Early reform efforts were undertaken by Hammuda Pasha (r. 1782-1814)1
and gained momentum under his successor Ahmad Bey (r. 1837-55).2 Due
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to the European military threat and France’s occupation of Algeria in 1830,
Ahmad Bey’s reforms had a prominently military aspect3 and were geared
toward modernizing the army.4 For this purpose, he founded the Bardo
Polytechnic School in 1840, on whose nature and mission Ibn Abi al-Diyaf
has provided first-hand information.5 Its primary purpose was to train army
officers and make them successful government bureaucrats by teaching
them “what the nizami soldier needed of the sciences, such as engineering,
geodesy, mathematics and the like, as well as the teaching of French, for
most of the books on these sciences are written in this language.”6 It also
included courses on history, geography, Arabic, and Islamic studies.7 While
French, English, and Italian teachers taught the modern subjects, the tradi-
tional subjects were entrusted to Shaykh Mahmud Qabadu (1812-71), an
eminent Zaytuna `alim and poet-scholar. An inquisitive man with a penchant
for mysticism and philosophy, Qabadu had a special interest in mathematics
and the natural sciences. Acting as the school’s spiritual guide, he seems to
have had a share in its administration along with its director, Luigi
Calligaris.8 Khayr al-Din, a mamluk of Circassian origin,9 was responsible
for supervising the school even though he was one of its students.10
A second important aspect of the bey’s reforms concerned the higher edu-
cation provided by the Zaytuna Mosque, Tunisia’s historical seat of Islamic
scholarship, which included introducing administrative, staff, teaching, and
financial measures designed to make the pursuit of Islamic knowledge more
systematic and stable. An equal number of Maliki and Hanafi teachers were
appointed and expected to teach specific courses daily for a specified salary
based on performance.A permanent source for securing their salaries was put
in place. To ensure that these measures were implemented, a supervisory
body consisting of the two shaykhs and the two chief judges of both schools
was formed.11 A decree, al-Mu`allaqah, was issued in 1842 to this effect.12
A third reform measure was the establishment in 1840 of a permanent
and catalogued library in the Zaytuna. The bey, who donated thousands of
volumes, directed the Shari`ah Council, the country’s highest religious
authority, to appoint two officers in the library to look after its management,
thereby facilitating “the pursuit of knowledge for the poor and the rich
alike.”13 The significance of these measures can be seen when contrasted
with the pre-reform situation. Generally speaking, the teachers’ personal
temperament, the lack of organization, the absence of specific regulations,
the shortage of reference books, and the uncertain financial sources had
harmed this institution for many years.14
A fourth, equally important, step was the abolition of slavery in 1848,
thus culminating a gradual policy launched by the bey nearly five years ear-
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lier. This policy consisted of two things: “the ban of selling slaves on the
market like animals” and the subsequent abolition of the slave market.15 The
significance of this decision might be seen through its psychological effect
on the personality and future career of Khayr al-Din, a mamluk who had
been bought for Ahmad Bey at an Istanbul slave market.16 This action was
also of great doctrinal importance for Islamic thought as well as global polit-
ical significance at a time when some European countries were championing
anti-slavery campaigns.
Qabadu, whose intimate relationship with Khayr al-Din and Ibn Abi al-
Diyaf (Ahmad Bey’s private secretary) is beyond doubt,17 was most likely
one source of inspiration behind these reforms, especially in the case of
Islamic learning and education. He was the link between the Zaytuna and the
new elite being formed along modern lines in the Bardo School. A group of
reform-minded people from the Zaytuna and this school who gradually clus-
tered around him would eventually form what Ibn `Ashur has described as
“a party founded on theoretical principles of educational, social, political
and administrative reform.”18
Most probably out of personal interest, Qabadu encouraged some of the
Bardo students to translate the lectures of their European instructors and the
textbooks used to teach modern disciplines into Arabic.19 He would then edit
the translation and give it an Islamic spirit. This experience allowed him to
interact with the European teachers and gain better insights into the factors
behind their countries’ power and progress. It also provided the seeds of a
theoretical and more systematic reformist thinking that went beyond the
pragmatic concerns of Ahmad Bey and his political aides and eventually
crystallized into a somewhat general doctrine of islah (reform).20 Qabadu
first formulated this doctrine in his introduction to the translation of a book
on the principles of warfare.21 For him, the causes of the Muslims’ back-
wardness should be traced to their attitudes rather than to Islam’s teachings.
The neglect of the “mathematical, natural, and philosophical sciences” was
the real cause of the Muslim world’s present state of decline and weakness.
For him, Muslims were no longer pursuing the natural sciences, and Europe
was building up its strength and might by assimilating Muslim scientific
achievements and developing them further. As a result, a new balance of
power favoring Europe had occurred. Given this analysis, the only way for
Muslims to regain their strength and protect themselves from western threats
was to cultivate the sciences they had lost by readopting them from Europe.
Qabadu saw this as an Islamic duty enjoined by the Qur’an.22
The above-mentioned reformist party, whose actions would become vis-
ible in the 1860s and 1870s, featured Khayr al-Din23 as its spokesman. Thanks
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to his previous experience with Ahmad Bey’s reforms,24 he had first-hand
knowledge and a better perspective on both the requirements and obstacles of
such an enterprise. This matured his conception of islah and strengthened his
ties with several people with whom he would work in the future. Toward the
end of Ahmad Bey’s rule, the old order had been undermined and the seeds
of a new one sown, although the country’s external appearance and the peo-
ple’s ordinary life had not changed much.25 The bey’s ambitious program can
be said to have failed materially,26 whereas the reformist thought of Khayr al-
Din and those associated with him reached a considerable level of maturity
and clarity of vision and won over more supporters.
The Second Phase: Political and Sociocultural Reform
Like those preceding them, the reform efforts undertaken during the second
half of the nineteenth century confronted a largely non-conducive internal
and external environment.27 However, a resolute will and strong zeal to work
for islah animated the handful of men who concurred with Khayr al-Din that
something had to be done to save what could be saved before European civ-
ilization’s “torrential stream” swept everything away.28 Put differently, there
was a growing awareness of the dangers menacing Muslim existence and of
the need to deflect them.
The major feature of this phase of reform was its concern with political,
constitutional, economic, cultural, and educational matters. Contrary to
Brown’s skepticism, Qabadu can be viewed as “the linchpin bringing
together the religious and political groups later to rally under the leadership
of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi.”29 Although Qabadu had earlier taught in the
Zaytuna, Muhammad Bey only promoted him to the position of first-class
professor in 1855, Bardo’s judge (1867),30 and the Maliki mufti of the
Shari`ah Council (1868).31 Given his inquisitive mind and interest in the nat-
ural sciences, we can imagine how Qabadu would have shown the Bardo
students how the modern disciplines are related to the Islamic teachings and
values while trying to convince the Zaytuna’s students and teachers of the
necessity to study those disciplines and reveal their importance to safeguard-
ing Islam’s grandeur and the Muslims’ strength. His major intellectual con-
tribution to the reform movement consisted in what can be considered “a
theory of the natural sciences.”32
Qabadu advocated this theory in the classroom, discussions with friends
and prominent people, in his scarce prose writings, and also through his
poetry. Considered a pioneer of renewal in poetic themes33 because of his
introduction of new topics related to the natural sciences and their technolog-
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ical applications,34 he used all possible means to convey his views to a larger
audience. Some of his Bardo and Zaytuna students, as well as prominent state
officers closely associated with him, espoused his ideas. The Bardo stu-
dents included Khayr al-Din Pasha, Muhammad Hussein (a.k.a. General
Hussein [d. 1887]), and Rostum,35 while those from the Zaytuna included
Salim BuHajib (1827-1924), Muhammad Bayram V (1840-89), `Umar ibn
al-Sheikh (1826-1911), and Muhammad al-Sanusi (1851-1900). Among the
prominent state officers were Ahmad ibn Abi al-Diyaf and Mustafa Sahib al-
Tabi` (d.1861). All of these scholars would play an important role in the sec-
ond round of reform during its apex under Khayr al-Din’s premiership.
The ulama involved in the reform wave of the 1860s and 1870s were not
only students of Qabadu; some of them were already reform-minded and
accomplished scholars. Two of them, Muhammad al-Tahir ibn `Ashur (1815-
68) and his student Muhammad al-`Aziz Bu`Attur (1825-1907) are worthy of
mention here. Ibn `Ashur’s family had an established tradition in Islamic
scholarship,36 while Bu`Attur’s family had a long tradition of makhzani (state
bureaucracy) service.37 Both were students of Ibrahim al-Riyahi (1766-1850),
the Maliki chief mufti and imam of the Zaytuna Mosque who was very influ-
ential during Ahmad Bey’s reign and strongly supported his reforms.38
Implanting a spirit of critical thinking and inclination to ijtihadwithin his stu-
dents, many of whom would join the reformist current, Shaykh al-Riyahi
would later be “remembered for his progressive mentality.”39
Unlike Ahmad Bey’s military-oriented program, the second round of
reforms was mainly concerned with constitutional, economic, administrative,
and socio-cultural reform. Although Ahmad Bey’s rule coincided with the
Ottomans’ tanzimat reforms (1839-76), only under his successor Muhammad
Bey were tanzimat-like steps taken. Ahmad Bey, who always kept a margin
of independence vis-à-vis Istanbul,40 was not prepared to limit his authority.41
This does not mean that his successor was more reform-minded. Rather,
Muhammad Bey resisted the reforms pushed for by the Sublime Porte on the
grounds that they were incompatible with the Shari`ah, despite some of the
ulama’s efforts to disprove his assertion.42 However, excessive European
pressure43 forced him to announce the historic `ahd al-aman (pacte fonda-
mental) document in September 1857 that instituted “the rights of rulers and
ruled,” laid out the principles of governance,44 and thus committed “Tunisia
to a reformist policy.”45 Owing to its overemphasis on the rights and privi-
leges of foreign (mainly European) expatriates, this document can be seen as
a continuation of the capitulations system that had existed in the Ottoman
Empire for many decades and reflected the extent of European intervention
in the Muslim world’s political and legislative affairs.
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A committee led by Prime Minister Mustafa Khaznadar and consisting
of Khayr al-Din, Ibn Abi al-Diyaf, and others, was formed to work out the
charter’s detailed rules and draft a constitution based upon them.46 Some of
the ulama appointed to it, such as Shaykh al-Islam Muhammad Bayram IV
and the chief Maliki mufti Ahmad Hussein, were worried about the conces-
sions given to non-Muslims and foreigners (clauses 6-11) and thus did not
support the charter wholeheartedly, despite their attempts to bring these
clauses into line with the Shari`ah.47 These worries, however, did not prevent
many reform-minded people from welcoming the `ahd al-aman as a signif-
icant step toward realizing their aspirations and ideals. Believing absolute
rule to be “contrary to both the Shari`ah rules and the dictates of reason,”48
they seem to have considered those privileges a necessary price to curb it.49
Before the committee completed its task, however, Muhammad al-
Sadiq acceded to the throne (September 1859) and pledged allegiance to the
document’s principles and ideals.50 A major step toward fulfilling his pledge
was the drafting of a constitution (qanun al-dawlah) in August 1860.51 Yet
this constitution, the first one in the modern Arab world,52 was promulgated
only in April 1861, after a French version of it was submitted to Napoleon
III when both rulers met together in Algiers in September 1860.53 In other
words, this constitutional reform could not be implemented until a European
power (France) sanctioned it.54 As Brown says, this “sufficiently epitomizes
the power relations surrounding the birth of ‘constitutionalism’ in Tunisia.”55
Whatever the case, the constitution dealt mainly with classical issues per-
taining to the jurisdiction and relationship of the executive, the legislative,
and the judiciary bodies.
Various laws and institutions were created to embody the principles and
ideals of both documents. Among the most significant ones were the follow-
ing: 1) the city of Tunis acquired a municipal government in 1858, with
Khayr al-Din as its president; 2) transforming Tunisia into a constitutional
monarchy, inspired by the European experience,56 the constitution paved the
way for restructuring the judiciary, including the formation of penal courts
and a court of appeal. New tribunals tended to divorce civil law from the
Shari`ah and would ultimately undermine the ulama’s authority57 ; and 3) a
legislative body, the Grand Council, was established under the chairmanship
of Mustafa Sahib al-Tabi`, who was shortly succeeded by Khayr al-Din.
Other council members were Ibn Abi al-Diyaf and General Hussein, a stu-
dent of Qabadu at the Bardo School and Khayr al-Din’s son-in-law; shaykhs
al-Tayyib al-Nayfar, Muhammad al-Tahir ibn `Ashur, Muhammad al-`Aziz
Bu`Attur, Salim BuHajib, `Umar ibn al-Sheikh; and other military and civil-
ians figures. Another event of cultural significance concerned the creation,
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in 1860, of an “official government gazette, Al-Ra’id al-Tunisi,”58 the coun-
try’s first newspaper.
These major aspects of reform in Tunisia during 1857-61 constituted the
first phase in the second round of reform. The Ottoman tanzimat were an
important source of inspiration for such leading Tunisian reformers as Khayr
al-Din, General Hussein, Ibn Abi al-Diyaf, and Qabadu, all of whom were
closely acquainted with and supportive of the Ottoman efforts.59 However,
they were not mere imitators, for Tunisia’s own indigenous reformist thought
had been growing for at least three decades. If Qabadu had outlined its the-
oretical blueprint, Khayr al-Din, Ibn Abi al-Diyaf, and others attempted to
translate it into appropriate programs. A student of Tunisian history has sug-
gested that the clauses of the `ahd al-aman, the first official declaration of
human rights in the contemporary Muslim world, bear the stamp of Khayr
al-Din.60 However, rather than seeing him as the sole agent of reformist
thinking, it would be more reasonable to consider him an intelligent and ded-
icated representative of the islah movement, one who was well attuned to
the challenges and demands of the age.
Before examining the last phase of Tunisia’s pre-colonial reformism, we
shall consider what happened to the previous reforms, all of which were
opposed mainly because they were not supported by any regulation of “the
actual balance of political forces in Tunisia.”61 Hence, besides the fact that
no substantial changes had been made in the country’s institutional and
administrative structures, implementing these reforms was not entrusted to
genuinely reform-minded people, but rather to those who “had little interest
in [them] beyond exploiting the façade of modern, Western constitutional-
ism and continuing governmental operations along the old lines of private
enrichment in the absence of accountability.”62 To better understand this real-
ity, it is appropriate to look more closely at some of these reforms’ internal
and structural inadequacies, especially those of their essential components,
the `ahd al-aman and the qanun al-dawlah.
Clauses 1, 3, and 4 of the Aman charter guaranteed the security and
equality of all residents in the regency, foreigners as well as locals, regard-
less of any considerations. Then, clauses 9 to 11 stipulated that the govern-
ment could not involve itself in any trade and commerce, that all foreigners
had the right to engage in all kinds of economic activity and were free to
own any kind of property, including real estate, without discrimination
between them and the indigenous people.63 The first set of clauses sanctioned
what the people concerned, mainly Europeans, had enjoyed since the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century. The last three clauses paved the way for
European economic domination64 “and exposed the [bey] to rival pressures
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from the consuls.”65 Although the Qanun curbed the bey’s authority by
empowering the Grand Council to remove him from office, it had, ironically,
given the real power to the grand vizier. Thus, Mustafa Khaznadar gained
the upper hand in nominating the members of the legislative assembly as
well as those of the other institutions created by the constitution.66 And thus
the stage was set for him and his allies to undermine the reforms.
A mamluk of Greek origin raised by Prince Ahmad (later Ahmad Bey),
Khaznadar first worked as the prince’s private treasurer before the latter
succeeded his father to the Husaynid throne in 1837. Then, he immediately
became Ahmad Bey’s khaznadar (treasurer).67 During the greater part of
his thirty-five-year tenure (until his dismissal in 1873),68 Khaznadar was in
charge of the central and far-reaching wizarat al-`amalah, a ministry that
combined finance and internal affairs. This gave him such real power that he
overshadowed Prime Minister Mustafa Sahib al-Tabi` due to the latter’s
“sedation and apathy.”69 With this key post, Khaznadar combined that of the
prime minister (wazir akbar) created by the bey in 1859.70 His tenure at the
treasury is linked with the rise of the notorious Mahmud bin `Ayyad (1810-
80) “to the commanding position of chief financial personage in the
regime.”71 A strong alliance developed between them, owing to their com-
mon interest of accumulating as much wealth as possible,72 for which pur-
pose they abused the bey’s almost total trust in them.73 Thanks to Bin
`Ayyad’s holding the post of qabid al-mal,74 Khaznadar practically monop-
olized “tax and concession farming” and thus “could assure greater central
control, both in the assessment and collection of revenue.”75 In return for this
empowerment, a great share of that revenue poured into his personal
accounts under various names.76 Consequently, the masses suffered from ris-
ing taxes and levies collected indiscriminately through all kinds of means,
including military raids.77 Moreover, Khaznadar and Bin `Ayyad burdened
the people with such heavy taxes and levies that they bound them to
increased poverty.78
Bin `Ayyad’s part in this drama ended when he fled to Paris in 1852
under the pretext of seeking medical treatment.79 In reality, he absconded with
“government funds and assets,”80 as well as many financial documents,81 that
he had acquired during his at least fifteen-year monopolization of govern-
ment import operations.82 Khaznadar continued to plunder the country under
Ahmad Bey’s successors, Muhammad Bey and Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey. To
him, all reforms meant nothing more than “new opportunities for graft and
private enrichment at the expense of the state.”83 Yet, the blame should not be
put on him alone or solely on his associates, for the system provided no “real
means of verifying the chief minister’s fantastic allegations concerning rev-
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enue and expenditure.”84 The beys do not seem to have been aware of the
problem’s gravity. After all, as long as the treasurer secured enough money
for the government’s and the palace’s needs and could cover the expenses of
the reform programs undertaken, things would look all right to them.
Anyway, Khaznadar and his machinations were part of the reality with
which the reformists had to cope if they were to take their aspirations and
ideals seriously. Khayr al-Din, the reformist current’s figurehead, was a close
and conscientious witness of this reality. He was well aware of the involve-
ment of Khaznadar, who was, ironically, his father-in-law. Earlier, Khayr al-
Din had stayed in Paris from 1853-57 to plead the government’s case against
Bin `Ayyad.85 His success, attained during the reign of Muhammad Bey, won
him the latter’s trust: he was appointed minister of the marine and, later on,
president of the newly established Legislative Assembly.
Given this situation and aware of Khaznadar’s personal interest in him
“as a man worth cultivating,” Khayr al-Din could have accommodated him-
self “to the existing government system simply by ‘going along’ with his
father-in-law.”86 But such a life did not conform to his ideals, for since the
time of Ahmad Bey he had consistently and uncompromisingly opposed the
policy of borrowing foreign currency at usurious rates. However, that was
Khaznadar’s royal road to finance government expenditures and satisfy his
insatiable graft. When Ahmad Bey commissioned him in 1853 to handle the
Bin `Ayyad affair, Khayr al-Din was also instructed to negotiate loans with
French and European bankers that could be contributed to the Ottoman
effort in the Crimean war. However, he was reluctant to do that and kept
making excuses until the bey’s death in 1855. His most important excuse
was that the creditors’ terms were detrimental to the country. Muhammad
Bey appreciated this later on, having understood that by refusing to do so
Khayr al-Din had saved the country from collapse.87
That was the spirit that guided Khayr al-Din in fulfilling his duties in
relation to the newly adopted reforms. But he soon had to face serious obsta-
cles. Under the pretext of implementing the reforms, Khaznadar secured for
himself, in addition to the premiership, five salaried posts as well as unoffi-
cial large sums of money smuggled into his unknown accounts from the
government’s treasury. Nasim Shammama (1805-73), another notorious
man who enjoyed French protection88 and who served as provincial gover-
nor and tax collector after Mahmud bin `Ayyad,89 was now Khaznadar’s
cat’s-paw. Although Khaznadar faced some restrictions during Muhammad
Bey’s rule due to the latter’s firmness and stern character,90 the situation
changed under Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey, who was almost totally controlled
by his premier.91
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Despite the deteriorating economy, the bey was persuaded to approve
new projects. Since the treasury could barely meet the ordinary government
expenses, Khaznadar financed them through foreign borrowing at usuri-
ous rates and increasing the personal levy.92 However, the Grand Council
rejected this solution when its approval was sought.93 This was the beginning
of a drift that ultimately led to the total collapse of the reforms. For the coun-
cil members, it became clear that their function was to supervise the govern-
ment’s conduct and curb the malpractices of the executive, including the bey.
Understanding that the council was not just a decoration, they took the spirit
and letter of both the `ahd al-aman and the qanun al-dawlah, and the ensu-
ing laws, seriously. In contrast, Khaznadar and his men fought anything that
jeopardized their interests and curbed their power. Thus, the prime minister
tried to discredit and defame his opponents by using his personal influence
on the bey. According to Bayram V, Khaznadar sought to empty the laws and
institutions of their real meaning by manipulating them to suit his own goals
and strove to revoke them.94 This conflict reached its peak in May 1862
when Khayr al-Din, after many fights with the premier, resigned from all of
his offices95 only to be replaced by Khaznadar himself as the council’s presi-
dent. Other reform-minded ministers, including General Hussein, Muham-
mad Agha, and Abu al-Thana’ Rostum, followed suit.96 Such pro-reform
ulama as Salim BuHajib and Bayram V, also withdrew and retired.97 Thus, all
hindrances to Khaznadar’s maneuverings were removed.
It should be remembered that Khaznadar and his local allies were not the
only players. Other more alert players with conflicting interests and compet-
ing agendas existed, namely, the European consuls. Tunisia was then part of
the “eastern question” that the European powers wanted to solve on their own
terms. In the 1860s, Tunisia became the scene of expanding European eco-
nomic interests. Yet the existence of the Grand Council, even with all of its
defects, constituted an obstacle to those interests, for it “hindered the consuls
from obtaining concessions from the [bey] through the traditional methods of
bribing high officials and threatening the [bey] with the use of force.”98
The rival consuls sought to undermine the Tunisian reforms. Although
their governments congratulated the bey for the reforms, the consuls, partic-
ularly the Frenchman Léon Roches and the Englishman Richard Wood,99
opposed those same reforms and impeded their implementation. For exam-
ple, under the principles of the aman charter’s granting of equal rights to all
of the country’s residents, it was expected that all Tunisian and European
subjects would “submit to Tunisian justice.”100 However, this principle could
not really be implemented. When a special tribunal was formed in June 1861
to try cases involving European litigants, the “French consul Léon Roches
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objected and, with his government’s support, insisted on following the cus-
tomary practice of having a case in which a European was the defendant
tried by his consul.”101
As an eyewitness of that period, Bayram V pointed out the opportunist
motivations behind the European consuls’ seemingly inconsistent behavior.
Roches and Wood, who urged the bey for reform,102 did so only insofar as it
“was not contradictory to the interests of their governments” and also con-
curred with anti-reform rulers that a “consultative government would lead to
the frustration of their purposes.” The reason, according to Bayram V, is that
the European powers were only concerned about “achieving their own objec-
tives abroad by all means,” no matter how such an attitude contradicted what
they professed and practiced at home.103 Thus, the ongoing double-standard
attitude of the European governments and their representatives in dealing
with others is nothing new, especially toward the Muslim world.
Khaznadar was a major intriguer with the European consuls, particu-
larly Roches and Wood, both of whom were actively promoting their own
countries’ economic interests. Roches pushed the bey to adopt independent
policies and positions toward Istanbul, while Wood pressed Khaznadar to
keep away from Paris. These contradictory pressures emptied the reforms of
any real content, allowed Khaznadar to emerge as the most powerful man,
and left the bey with only nominal authority.104 As all obstacles to the prime
minister’s financial policies were now removed, he doubled the poll tax from
36 to 72 riyals on every adult and continued to borrow both at home and
abroad at very high interest rates. While French, British and Italian bankers
were the major creditors, the local lenders were mainly French, Italian, and
Jewish merchants – “the latter being mainly British subjects or protégés.”105
The main reason for this lust for borrowing was that Khaznadar “and his
agents obtained [a] rich commission on every loan contracted.”106
Coupled with worsening agricultural seasons, Khaznadar’s policies
caught Tunisia up in a vicious circle. The increased poll tax and the repres-
sive means of levying it were the immediate causes of the insurgency that
broke out in 1864.107 The resulting financial crisis and social unrest was met
with a no-return strategy of brutal repression, property confiscation, and
more foreign borrowing.108 Furthermore, this crisis was exploited to deal a
blow to the reforms. Khaznadar and his allies spread rumors that the new
laws’ un-Islamic character had caused the insurgency.109 Beauval, the new
French consul, also played his part by contacting the insurgency leader to
assure him of his country’s support and using “the occasion [of the insur-
gency] to force the [bey] to abolish the constitution.”110 Eventually, on 1 May
1864, the constitution was suspended and the Grand Council and all other
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institutions created to implement the reforms based on the `ahd al-aman
were dissolved.111
The anti-reform clan rejoiced and wrought their wrath on the reformists,
accusing them of leading the country to anarchy and ruin.112 However, sus-
pending the constitution and its accompanying measures could not save
Tunisia. A few years later, “Khaznadar’s policy of borrowing foreign cur-
rency was brought to final a reckoning in 1869, with bankruptcy and the estab-
lishment of an Anglo-French-Italian debt commission.”113 This commission’s
task consisted of drawing up “a budget for the Tunisian state and control-
ling all state expenditure,”114 as well as consolidating the creditors’ debts and
ensuring their payment.115 Likewise, Tunisia’s economic independence was
not only diminished,116 but practically lost.117
The Last Phase of Indigenous Reform
Intellectual Underpinnings
Khayr al-Din’s resignation “affected the wise people of the Regency, since
there was no clear reason for it whether in respect of age or physical fitness,
as he was at the best of his youth.”118 After this event, he spent his time reflect-
ing upon his previous experience, broadening his knowledge of the problems
of Muslim society and contemporary European developments, and sharpen-
ing his thoughts on reform.119 The views expressed in his Aqwam al-
Masalik120 were formulated in relation to the larger context of the Ottoman
Empire. Some scholars have seen an intellectual similarity between him and
Ibn Khaldun. For Hourani,
[both] were Tunisians, both wrote their books in a moment of withdraw-
al from political life; both books are concerned in some way with the
problem of the rise and decline of States, and each consists of an intro-
duction, laying down general principles, and several parts.121
This similarity is manifested in Khayr al-Din’s attempt to “do for the mod-
ern age what Ibn Khaldun had done for an earlier one.”122 However, the sim-
ilarity is deeper than these external aspects,123 for Khayr al-Din examined the
deep causes of why the reforms undertaken since the time of Ahmad Bey
ultimately failed. As he himself says, his reflection on “the causes of the
progress and backwardness of nations generation after generation” and his
examination of what Muslim and European historians had written about the
Muslim world’s conditions propelled him “to assert what no intelligent
Muslim will contradict and [what] no one who has been shown the evidence
will oppose.”124
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Like Ibn Khaldun, he had a deep sense of the unity of human history that
was manifesting itself more clearly than ever before. Ibn Khaldun, however,
saw this unity primarily in terms of the Muslim experience, in which “a gen-
eral change of conditions” had occurred, “as if the entire world had changed
and the whole world had been altered, as if it were a new and repeated cre-
ation, a world brought into existence anew.”125 Khayr al-Din saw it at a rather
more universal level: the Muslim world’s destiny had become subject to
both internal factors and to developments happening beyond its borders.
Accordingly, “if we consider the many ways which have been created in
these times to bring men and ideas closer together, we will not hesitate to
visualize the world as a single, united country peopled by various nations
who surely need each other.”126
Khayr al-Din, who was well aware of the positive aspect of the global-
izing forces that had been operating for at least one century, was also aware
of their negative consequences. In fact, those forces had given rise to a
Europe that posed a threat to Muslim peoples and infringed upon them in
different ways, from diplomatic pressure to military occupation. In this con-
nection, he drew the reader’s attention to an important feature of the eco-
nomic relations between Europe and other nations: the added value of the
raw materials supplied by non-European countries was benefiting only those
who did not produce them but had the financial and technical means to buy
and manufacture them. He wrote that “our shepherd, or silk farmer or cot-
ton farmer, defying fatigue for the entire year, sells the produce of his labor
to the European for a cheap price, and then in a short time buy it back, after
it has been processed, at a price several times higher.”127
Believing that Muslim destiny was shaped by both external and internal
factors, he analyzed the causes of Muslim decline and European progress. His
study of the latter drew on personal experience and direct observation based
upon his long familiarity with Europe’s achievements through regular and
long visits to many of its countries. During 1863-67, he was sent to Paris and
other European capitals to convey the bey’s appreciation of their approval of
Tunisia’s constitution.128 His long stays in Europe, especially France,129
allowed him to systematize his knowledge of Europe’s political systems and
to better understand the factors behind its advancement and power.
Although Khayr al-Din’s training was mainly in the military, European
military industry and technology were not his main interest. Such a focus
could have been justified by the fact that Tunisia was then facing the imme-
diate threat of military invasion by the French forces that had occupied
Algeria. This could also have been seen as a continuation of Ahmad Bey’s
military-based modernization program. Moreover, interest in European civi-
El-Mesawi: Muslim Reformist Action in Nineteenth-century Tunisia 61
lization’s military aspects would have attuned him to the Ottomans’ reformist
trends, especially those undertaken in Istanbul and Cairo, where attempts had
been made to plant military-oriented industries to overcome their archaic mil-
itary technology and face the increasing European threat. Yet Khayr al-Din
appears to have reached a negative evaluation of those efforts and to have had
less faith in their moving spirit. Summarizing the main purpose of Aqwam al-
Masalik, he said:
I was fired to believe that if I assembled what years of thought and reflec-
tion had produced plus what I had seen during my travels to various states
of Europe (…), then my effort might not be without benefit, especially if
it comes upon hearts working together in defense of Islam.130
So, what is it in that reflection and those travels that could benefit Islam
and Muslims?
Khayr al-Din was primarily interested in “inventions related to eco-
nomic and administrative policies” and the “progress in the governance of
mankind which led to the utmost point of prosperity” in Europe131; in other
words, “the foundations and conditions of European civilization as well as the
institutions of the great states of Europe.”132 It seems that he was keen to
develop his own understanding and version of reform instead of just merely
replicating the tanzimat that had been adopted in Istanbul. He thus saw the
need to give the reforms, in terms of both content and justification, a Tunisian
flavor owing much to Ibn Khaldun’s legacy.133 This does not mean that his
thought totally broke with the ideas that had grown for many decades in the
empire. As a matter of fact, his reform project was envisioned within the
wider Ottoman context and had a clear awareness of the strong links between
its different parts.134 A strong advocate of the idea that separating Tunisia from
Istanbul would be fateful for both of them,135 his reform program was part of
a global consideration of the “Eastern question.”136 Likewise, what applied to
Tunisia was equally applicable to the rest of the Ottoman domains, given the
commonality of their essential problems.137
Khayr al-Din’s audience consisted of two groups, the statesmen
(umara’) and the ulama, without ignoring the general public. First of all, his
book was “an appeal to those statesmen and savants having enthusiasm and
resolution to seek all possible ways leading to the improvement of the con-
dition of the Islamic ummah and the promotion of the means of her civiliza-
tional development.”138 Second, it was “a warning for the heedless among
the Muslim masses against their persistent rejection of what is praiseworthy
and in conformity with our Law in the conduct of others, simply because
they are possessed by the idea that the behavior and organization of non-
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Muslims must be renounced.”139 As expected, the thrust of his argument was
directed to statesmen and scholars, for these two elites were primarily
responsible for their fellow Muslims’ well-being. Likewise, he was offering
them a program to help them fulfill their duties toward the community. This
program was derived from a long study of why nations declined and pro-
gressed, especially of the factors that led “the European kingdoms” to attain
“their present strength and worldly power.”140 He tried to acquaint Muslims
with how the Europeans had attained that position so that they could “choose
from them what is suitable to our own situation and at the same time sup-
ports and is compatible with our Shari`ah, so that we may be able to restore
what was taken from our hands and by using it overcome the present
predicament of negligence existing among us.”141 To make his program con-
vincing and appealing, he assured both elites that his argument was based on
both “traditional and rational” considerations.142
Khayr al-Din was mainly interested in “the expansion in the scope of the
sciences and knowledge, the smoothing of the paths to wealth in agriculture
and trade, the promotion of all industries, and the elimination of the causes
of idleness.”143 But these were not the ultimate or only reasons; rather, they
were consequent upon other more fundamental factors. To him, the main con-
dition for all of this was “good government from which is born security
which in turn gives rise to hope, wherefrom follows excellence in work.”144
This is the essence of the tanzimat “which rest on two pillars – justice and
freedom – both of which are two fundamental things in our Shari`ah”145 …
[which] are the prerequisites for strength and soundness in all kingdoms.”146
If Ibn Khaldun considered injustice to be the root cause of a state’s fall,
Khayr al-Din saw the absence of freedom as the cause of almost all social
and political ills. For him, “if liberty is lost in the kingdom, then comfort and
wealth will disappear, and poverty and rise in prices will overwhelm its peo-
ple, and their perceptiveness and vigor will be weakened, as reason and
experience reveal.”147
In his argument for the legitimacy of borrowing from non-Muslims,
Khayr al-Din started from the same premise as Qabadu and many other
nineteenth-century Muslim reformist thinkers. Adopting modern science
and technology as developed by the Europeans, Qabadu argued, is a Qur’anic
imperative whereby Muslims are required to acquire whatever enables them
to promote the cause of Islam and deter its enemies.148 Qabadu went even fur-
ther by reminding his fellow Muslims that modern sciences had actually been
started and pursued by such Muslim sages as Ibn al-Haytham, and that by
adopting them Muslims would only be restoring what they had lost.149 Khayr
al-Din extended this argument to institutions and modes of organization. In
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his view, the necessary progress and strength needed by Muslims could not
be achieved in the absence of the tanzimat institutions, whose success the
European experience had proven beyond doubt.150 Referring to historical
precedents from the period of Prophet Muhammad and afterward to show the
Muslims’openness to benefiting from other people’s achievements, Khayr al-
Din argued on the basis of a prophetic tradition enjoining Muslims to seek
wisdom wherever they find it. The pursuit of truth, he insisted, was charac-
teristic of Muslims regardless where it might be found.151
Leaving aside the details of the material he used to construct his argu-
ment, the quintessence of his reform project’s theoretical content will now be
presented. As one contemporary writer has observed, Khayr al-Din was a
keen student of Islamic thought who could make use of the rich legacy of
scholars like al-Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun. He developed an original syn-
thesis of “authenticity and modernity” and presented Islamic teachings in “a
more dynamic and efficient way,” one that responded creatively to the
demands of the modern age.152 To remove or at least attenuate Muslim suspi-
cion about the tanzimat’s non-Muslim origin, Khayr al-Din argued that these
institutions were a recent development in Europe. According to him, Europe,
which had previously been sunk in “ignorance and oppression,” possessed
no unique factors, such as “fertility or temperateness of its regions, for simi-
lar or even better conditions are found in other parts of the world,”153 that
could account four such progress. Neither could such progress be attributed
to Christianity, which, due to its asceticism and retirement from the world,
forbade mingling with political life and mundane affairs.154 Moreover, the
tanzimat had a universal character, for the fundamental criterion for judging
them was their efficiency as a means to progress and a better organization of
the state and society.155
Khayr al-Din also settled the legitimacy aspect by arguing for the tan-
zimat’s neutral character vis-à-vis European religious culture so that it would
look sound from the Islamic viewpoint and, hence, would be acceptable to
the ulama. However, the tanzimat had other implications, especially at the
political and administrative levels, which might make the absolute rulers
suspicious. Here, many hindrances needed to be removed, namely, the deep-
seated practices of governance and administration that certain ulama had
justified in theoretical terms.
Khayr al-Din based his view on the following premises: It is “God’s
custom in His world that justice, good management and an administrative
system duly complied with, be the causes of the increase in wealth, lives and
produce,”156 and that “the contrary should cause diminution in all that.”157
Since injustice and oppression are part of humanity’s natural propensities,
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these propensities “are such that unrestricted authority for kings brings about
all sorts of injustice and oppression.”158 Thus, shura (consultation) is such a
fundamental Islamic principle that God prescribed it even on “His infallible
Prophet, although he could have dispensed with it thanks to the Divine inspi-
ration and thanks also to the many perfections which God placed in him.”
The underlying reason for doing so was “that it [shura] should become a tra-
dition incumbent upon rulers after him.”159
Shura does not operate on its own, however, for its implementation
requires certain mechanisms identified by Khayr al-Din with the concepts of
al-amr bi al-ma`ruf (commanding right and forbidding wrong) and ahl al-
hall wa al-`aqd (those who loosen and bind). In fact, he saw an essential and
dialectical relationship between the necessity of political authority (wazi`)
and the need for ahl al-hall wa al-`aqd in human society. For this, he drew
on the views of such classical Muslim scholars as al-Mawardi, al-Ghazzali,
and Ibn Khaldun. He maintained that political authority is “essential for the
maintenance of the human species” to restrain the individuals’ inclination to
infringe upon one another’s rights and is necessary to preserving order and
security in society. However, this authority needs to be checked and
restrained, for if the person exercising it “were left to do as he pleases and
rule as he sees fit, the fruits expected from the need of establishing such an
authority in the ummah will not come about, as the original state of heed-
lessness would remain unabated.”160 Borrowing Ibn Khaldun’s typology of
the revealed and rational laws that are necessary for social life, Khayr al-Din
warned that such laws are always prone to violation by the people. It is,
therefore, “incumbent upon the ulama and the notables of the ummah to
resist [the] evil” resulting from such violations.161
Since the statesmen and the ulama were responsible for the ummah’s
well-being and progress, he visualized a harmonious association between
them that would enable them to work together as one body “for the benefit
of the ummah by furthering her interests and warding off her harms.”162 This
association is “one of the most important duties in the Shari`ah for making
the public interest prevail.”163 To show the necessity of this collaboration, he
relied on usul al-fiqh literature concerning the conditions of ijtihad. He
argued that “just as the administration of the Shari`ah rulings depends on
knowledge of the texts, so too it depends upon knowledge of the circum-
stances that should be considered in implementing those texts.”164 Otherwise,
great harm will befall the ummah; if the ulama keep away from the rulers,
they will close upon themselves “the doors leading to knowledge of those
circumstances” and open “the doors to the tyranny of the rulers” who would
then be ruling “without restraint.”165
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Moreover, most rulers cannot carry out the government’s political func-
tions “in accordance with the Shari`ah principles for various reasons.”
Accordingly, since the harm resulting from their unrestrained conduct is
obvious, “the leading ulama are rightly suited to examine the politics of their
countries, consider the imperfections occurring in their domestic and foreign
affairs, and assist the political leaders in the organization of the tanzimat,
patterned according to the Shari`ah.” They should consider realizing the
ummah’s interest by promoting what is beneficial and keeping to a minimum
what is harmful.166 For Khayr al-Din, all of this is an integral part of siyasah
shar`iyah,167 which is grounded in Islam’s social laws. These laws, which
allow no class discrimination, are founded on the concept of “people’s
absolute equality of rights and constitute the ideal of justice that many emi-
nent men struggled to achieve in European [legal] codes.”168
He then demonstrated the equivalence between these Islamic concepts
and institutions and their European counterparts. For him, Europe’s estab-
lishment of councils and freedom of the press had the sole purpose of fulfill-
ing the ulama’s role of “commanding good and preventing evil.” In both
cases, the objective is to require “an accounting from the state in order that
its conduct may be upright, even though the ways leading to this end may
differ.” He believed that Muslim rulers feared the ulama, just as European
kings feared “the councils and the public opinion proceeding from them and
from the freedom of the press.”169
Nevertheless, some more serious objections still had to be answered. In
an attempt apparently designed to win over the ruler, he admitted “the possi-
bility of finding among kings one who conducts properly the affairs of the
kingdom without consulting the ahl al-hall wa al-`aqd and is motivated by
the love of justice to seek the aid of an informed and faithful minister to
advise him in complicated matters of public interest.” But this is something
“rare and not to be taken into account as it depends on qualities that are sel-
dom combined in one person,” and even if we assume that “these qualities
were combined in a permanent manner in one person, they would disappear
with his death.”170 Thus the ummah’s fate must not be left to a single individ-
ual, whatever his personal qualities and merits; hence, the necessity of “the
participation of ahl al-hall wa al-`aqd in fundamental political matters, with
the responsibility for direct administration of the kingdom placed on the exec-
utive ministers in accordance with precise laws suitable to the situation of the
kingdom.”171 He further adduced that those “kingdoms administered without
well-observed laws under the supervision of ahl al-hall wa al-`aqd will be
limited in their best as well as in their worst to the person of king.” Thus,
“their success will depend on his competence and uprightness.”172
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The political participation of those qualified to loosen and bind might
still be opposed on the ground that it “would be a restriction of the imam’s
jurisdiction and his executive powers.”173 Relying on al-Mawardi’s Al-Ahkam
al-Sultaniyah, Khayr al-Din dealt with this via the classical Islamic idea of
wizarat al-tawfid, defined as the imam appointing a minister to whom “he
delegates authority to administer affairs as he sees fit and to execute them in
accordance with his own independent judgment.” In al-Mawardi’s view, the
Qur’anic account of Prophet Moses and his brother Aaron supports this del-
egation of authority.174 If this is acceptable and “is not deemed a diminution”
of the imam’s authority, Khayr al-Din argued, “then his sharing of power with
a group – ahl al-hall wa al-`aqd – in all aspects of policy is even more per-
missible because a group of opinions is more likely to attain the correct
answer.”175 After mentioning the views of some leading kalam scholars on
this issue, he concluded that “it is thus clear how even more explicitly accept-
able is consultation in general policy matters in the sense referred to here, for
this is less extensive than consultation in all executive acts.”176 According to
him, this is nothing but the meaning and practice of siyasah shar`iyah as
explained by authoritative Muslim scholars of various schools in the past.177
To further bolster his view regarding the ulama’s necessary participation
in policy making and show its possible positive results for both rulers and
subjects, Khayr al-Din used the following parable:
The owner of a large garden, for example, in the management and care of
his trees would not be able to do without the assistance of helpers knowl-
edgeable about trees and what causes them to prosper and wither. Now it
might happen that the owner of the garden wanted to cut some of the
branches of his trees believing that would strengthen the roots and increase
the fruit, but his helpers disagreed knowing from the basic principles of
cultivation that pruning at that time would kill the tree at the roots. In such
circumstances to obstruct the owner’s wish could not be considered a
restriction on the scope of his supervision or his complete executive
authority on his garden.
Similarly,
[T]he interests of the ummah and managing its policies are matters that do
not come easily to everyone. In such circumstances to obstruct his will
when he does something beyond the limits of permissible action is, as we
have explained, a means of liberation from the unsoundness of the argu-
ment that consultation is a diminution of the imam’s authority. This is
because his freedom of action concerning the condition of the subjects does
not extend beyond the limits of public interest.178
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The foregoing exposition of Khayr al-Din’s views reveals the main line
of his reasoning. The previous two quotations clearly show that he viewed
the established conception and old practices of governance as the major hin-
drances to any real reform. His argument against autocratic and despotic rule
is carried out on two planes: 1) the necessity of definite laws determining the
obligations and prerogatives of the ruler, his ministers, and other state offi-
cers, and 2) the need for the notables, especially the ulama, to help adminis-
ter the ummah’s political affairs. As he expressed his ideas in a classical
Islamic language, we do not come across such terms as democracy, parties,
or separation of powers. This is not due to his unawareness of current
European political theories, but rather a matter of ideological orientation and
calculated choice. Interested in those aspects of European life that could be
relevant and suitable to Tunisian society, he maintained from the beginning
that the purpose of describing Europe’s worldly achievements “is that we
may choose from them what is suitable to our own situation.”179 As Brown
rightly said, Khayr al-Din was prepared “to learn from Europe unburdened
by inferiority complex or mental anguish”; his was a “serious mind, [a] pen-
etrating intellect that was used for specific and limited ends.”180
Despite his emphasis on freedom as a precondition for progress and
development, he did not consider multi-party democracy necessary, given
the prevailing circumstances of Tunisian society of his time. He argued that
in establishing political liberty, one “has an obligation to take into consider-
ation the situation of the inhabitants and the extent of their progress in
knowledge and sciences in order to know when it is possible to grant com-
plete liberty and when it is not possible.”181 Although he saw the need for
radical reforms that conformed with the country’s needs and the people’s
values, he believed that only through perseverance and by adaptating the
new institutions could such reforms succeed and not become counterproduc-
tive. For him, reform was not merely substituting the archaic Muslim insti-
tutions with “a regime of hybrid of European institutions” that would be
transplanted in countries “where people’s temperament, lifestyles, education
and environment are different.”182
In addition, he worried about the loyalty of the non-Muslim European
colonists then living in Tunisia and the devious maneuvering by European
consuls to which they were subject.183 As Ottoman and Tunisian history had
shown, such people were, thanks to the capitulations regime, being manipu-
lated, as he put it, “for purposes which cannot be hidden.”184 Fully aware of
the capitulations’ crucial role “as an expression of the unequal power rela-
tionship on the international level,”185 he saw the attitude of the European
powers as an “obstacle to the success of the tanzimat in all Islamic coun-
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tries.”186 Using “old agreements [i.e., capitulations]187 no longer consonant
with the time,” those powers openly opposed their subjects’ submission to
“the laws of the Muslim countries in which they reside.”188 Moreover, Euro-
pean governments infringed upon Muslim sovereignty by exploiting the
local governments’ weaknesses and corruption, and their consuls extended
their protection to local inhabitants, including Muslims. Hence, the category
of protégés came about and did serious harm to Tunisia. According to Khayr
al-Din, granting full liberty without considering the consequences of these
obstacles would only “facilitate their [i.e., Europeans’] purposes,” because
such liberty requires, as a precondition, “the agreement among all of the sub-
jects concerning the interest of the kingdom and the strengthening of the
state.”189 With this in mind, Khayr al-Din was mainly concerned with secur-
ing good government and effective administration, together with a system of
accountability that would eventually unite the people, restore their confi-
dence in the state, establish security and order in their life, and instill in them
hope and motivation for work.190
Educational Reform and the Ulama
Besides the socio-political aspects of Khayr al-Din’s program,191 there is the
matter of education. As a resolute advocate of modernizing Muslim educa-
tion, he built on Ahmed Bey’s achievements. But since his priorities differed,
he focused on Europe’s institutions of learning and educational systems.
Believing that “encouraging the sciences and facilitating their use” were the
main factors behind Europe’s progress,192 he studied its educational systems,
especially France’s, including the different levels of schooling, the disciplines
studied, the curriculum, and the institutions disseminating knowledge.193
Khayr al-Din believed that Europeans had developed libraries “in all
branches of “knowledge” “out of their desire to expand knowledge,” which
is “the foundation of human progress and civilization.”194 For him, the “great
difference in the stock of knowledge [among European countries] reveals
how freedom influences the kingdoms.”195 Yet he was not merely interested
in the libraries’ quantitative aspect; rather, he was far more concerned about
how people could benefit from the libraries’ acquisitions.196 His interest in
knowledge and education found its specific translation in the policies and
programs he strove to implement when he was Tunisia’s premier (1873-
77).197 Khayr al-Din personally chaired the sessions that prepared the pro-
grams and policies of educational reform, thereby showing how important
education was to him.198 In Tunisia’s capital and other major cities, he
encouraged “the rehabilitation and expansion of schools.”199
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Khayr al-Din’s educational reform sought to reorganize Islamic educa-
tion in the Zaytuna and found a new school: the Collège Sadiki. Through his
minister of education and public works, General Muhammad Hussein, he
introduced several changes in the Zaytuna. For example, the Zaytuna’s stud-
ies were divided into high, intermediate, and elementary levels, and a
records system was introduced so that each student would have a study book
for “the courses he would study, an assessment of his performance and work,
and his exam results.”200 This new school was significant, for instead of reha-
bilitating the Bardo, Khayr al-Din seems to have tried to distance his reform
program from previous experiments. Nowhere in hisAqwam al-Masalik and
Mémoires does he mention the most outstanding ones, namely promulgating
the constitution and establishing the Grand Council. Most likely, he wanted
to give the impression that his program was different from the framework,
orientation, and objectives of the earlier ones.
The Collège Sadiki’s main goal was to train the civil servants needed by
the state bureaucracy.201 A special fund was created to ensure its continuity
and financial support.202 In addition to Islamic subjects, in which it followed
the Zaytuna system, its curriculum included mathematics, physical and nat-
ural sciences, social studies, and foreign languages.203 As one Tunisian his-
torian has observed, “the means of acceding to a culture open to the modern
world were provided for” the school’s students.204 These aspects of educa-
tional reform were consolidated through three things. 1) a national library
was founded and received, as its first gift, 1,100 manuscripts donated by
Khayr al-Din205; 2) Islamic endowments were reorganized by creating a
Jam`iyyat al-Awqaf. Its chairman, Bayram V, was responsible for adminis-
tering religious foundations and ensuring “that the revenue derived from
them was used for the purpose for which it was intended.”206 This was very
significant, because these endowments were the major source of financial
support of Islamic education in Tunisia; and 3) renewing Al-Ra’id at-Tunisi
and reactivating the Official Press, both of which were founded in 1860 but
had fallen into neglect and idleness. While Muhammad al-Sanusi, a reform-
inclined young `alim succeeded the French Arabist Mansour Carletti as edi-
tor, Bayram V became director of both the press and the gazette.207 As a
result, more of classical works in Islamic jurisprudence, prophetic traditions,
and history, and similar subjects were published. All of these reforms were
crucial to the rise of a dynamic intellectual and cultural activity. They also
had a great impact on Tunisian circles, which would continue long after the
French occupation, by widening the reach of reformist thinking and raising
the literate elite’s awareness of the many aspects of modern European devel-
opments in thought and life.208
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Finally, Khayr al-Din’s relationship with the ulama and the latter’s atti-
tude toward the reformist current and involvement therein is worthy of atten-
tion here. The cooperation between the ulama and rulers was manifested in
the appointment of several ulama to various positions in his government. This
was not, however, the only form that such cooperation took. Rather, it had
rather a much deeper aspect, that of an intellectual cooperation that shaped
the ideas expressed inAqwamal-Masalik. Without casting unnecessary doubt
on Khayr al-Din’s personal qualifications,209 the scholarly contribution of the
Zaytuna ulama to this book has raised the interest of some writers. We have
already indicated Khayr al-Din’s intimate relationship with people like
Qabadu and Ibn Abi al-Diyaf and mentioned some of the ulama involved in
implementing his reforms. What is of special significance here is, however,
the intellectual affinity whereby Aqwam al-Masalik can be seen as a reflec-
tion of a general reformist current with Khayr al-Din as its mouthpiece.
After his resignation in 1862, Khayr al-Din devoted himself to his group
of friends and disciples, who included both scholars and politicians. They
would come to him somewhat secretly, discuss and refine their reformist
doctrines, all the while reflecting on the obstacles that undermined previous
attempts. The outcome of this activity was “the seminal book Aqwam al-
Masalik fi Ma`rifat Ahwal al-Mamalik written by Khayr al-Din.”210 Thus,
this book was the result of collective thinking that harmonized the reformist
ideas that had grown over a few decades.
While “the over-all unity and logical consistency of the book make clear
that, in any case, a single mind guided its final development,”211 the material
used to develop its argument requires special consideration. Some scholars
have correctly observed that this work is firmly rooted in the classical Islamic
intellectual tradition.212 But the issue here implies more than this general
aspect. Its impressive and appropriate references to previous Islamic scholars
can be classified into two groups: such figures as al-Mawardi, al-Ghazzali,
and Ibn Khaldun, and another group of scholars like Sa`d al-Din al-Taftazani,
al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Mawwaq, al-Qarafi, Ibn `Aqil, Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyyah, `Abd al-Hakim al-Siyalkuti, and Ibn al-`Arabi.213 As a general,
though adequate, knowledge of Islamic thought may not be sufficient for one
to be familiar with these scholars’subtle ideas and arguments, it has been sug-
gested that “only ulama would normally be expected to know” them.214
Accordingly, Khayr al-Din’s collaboration with reformist ulama in writ-
ing and developing this book’s argument assumed the form of specific
assignments, whereby some ulama grounded its ideas in a classical Islamic
theoretical framework. Among Khayr al-Din’s close collaborators in this
regard, Salim BuHajib has been mentioned as the most influential sup-
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porter and propagator of reformist ideas, thanks to his high standing.215 Some
believe that he provided Khayr al-Din not only with the relevant juridical
material, but also was the book’s final editor and an active member of the
reformist movement.216 Putting this point into relief is not, therefore, a mat-
ter of “jalousie de clerc,” as Morsy has opined,217 but rather a matter of tex-
tual and historical evidence.218
Conclusion
The spirit that guided the Islamic reformist actions in Tunisia was one of
realizing an original and dynamic synthesis of modern life and Islamic val-
ues and principles in order to restore Muslim grandeur and sovereignty. Its
agents, especially Khayr al-Din, knew what was needed to achieve such a
goal and what could undermine it. An important aspect of this involved the
ulama’s contribution to shaping the theoretical content of this undertaking,
as epitomized in Aqwam al-Masalik. This illustrated one of its key ideas,
namely, the cooperation between statesmen and religious scholars in devis-
ing the necessary reforms.219 The colonial powers, however, had already
decided the fate of this cooperation and of Muslim reform endeavors both at
home and abroad, as reformists had to face the inertia or ill will of their com-
patriots and the covetous desires of Europe at the same time.220 Combined
domestic intrigue and European pressure forced the great spokesman of
Tunisian reformism to quit office (1877) and seek a chance to pursue his
program from Istanbul.221 The establishment of the French protectorate in
1881, after Europe had agreed upon it at the Berlin Conference in June
1878,222 dealt Tunisia the fatal blow and revealed the futility of homegrown
reform and self-conceived renewal in relation to imperialist schemes and
ends. Yet Khayr al-Din’s allies would continue the struggle for reform most
probably with a new agenda and under different forms – a subject worthy of
study but one that lies beyond the limits of this article.
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